Xi Jinping China’s long standing and presumably long-term leader, well known for his use of political purges to centralize power, and ensure his ongoing position within the Chinese Leadership. In each of his previous terms he has launched at least one major campaign that has radically changed the make-up of China’s political establishment. Recently, The Economist reported that another removal of senior key officials, this time in the military is underway. This purge likely includes General He Weidong, one of two vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission, who had been rapidly elevated by Xi, and was viewed as an increasingly important figure in the PLA. His seeming removal comes after key defence ministry officials Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were removed with little explanation last year. A key theme of Xi’s purges is that they serve a dual purpose. There is strong evidence that they remove truly corrupt individuals but also provide cover for eliminating political rivals in the process. Xi loyalists now dominate virtually every segment of Chinese public life and many of his hand-picked comrades are the ones being targeted in the latest round of ousters.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is notoriously opaque, but one thing is abundantly clear: Xi’s most recent round of purges, especially at this stage in his political career, show that China’s strongman leader views his position as potentially insecure where rivals, even seemingly loyal ones become increasingly problematic. On the one hand, these purges likely signal that Xi believes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must be reformed, and strong evidence suggests that some of those displaced are being removed for just that reason. However, it is likely that many of the high profile officers being targeted are for political reasons, including Xi’s broader policy failures. Targeting them serves to remind the military if it were to be called on to shore up his political legitimacy, what he expects.
The PLA’s Role in Politics
The role of the Chinese military varies substantially from the role armed forces play in a Western style democracy. In countries like the US, the military operates as a function of the executive branch of government and reports to elected civilian leadership. However, in China, and in most, if not all Communist regimes, the military is an arm of the Communist Party and its loyalties belong to the Party, not necessarily the Chinese state. PLA soldiers spend much of their time reading political theory and taking loyalty oaths all the while high-level decisions are supervised by Party Commissars.
The reasons for this dynamic are inherent to the revolutionary origins of the People’s Republic of China, and the nature of the CCP as being the all encompassing arm of power. As a result, in addition to the traditional role of a military, protecting the country, and advancing foreign policy goals, the PLA’s core mission also involves ensuring the CCP’s continued hold on power. As a result, leadership in the PLA is contingent upon Party loyalty and until recently, the leadership in the Party was often composed of top military leaders. Over time, however, the presence of large numbers of military officials in political leadership has declined, as the CCP has shifted away from a revolutionary movement to one that must govern rather than engage in perpetual revolution. As a result, more traditional civilian elites have emerged as the primary leaders of the Party.
Placing Xi’s Purge in Context
After over a decade in power and consistent purges, Xi has likely removed most of the political rivals that held power prior to his term. In late 2022, Xi achieved complete political centralization by pushing out all dissenting voices in China’s top governing bodies, the Politburo, and the Politburo Standing Committee, and replacing them with staunch loyalists. The most recent purges have been of party leaders who are Xi’s personal appointments but who have built their own power bases.
Guoguang Wu, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, provides an insightful explanation for this seemingly strange behavior. Wu compares Xi’s conduct to Joseph Stalin, who famously ran continuous purges throughout his tenure as leader of the Soviet Union. These purges enforced discipline and kept political leadership in line, especially after major policy failures, such as the use of forced agriculture collectivization that subsequently led to a massive famine, all while ensuring alternate power centers did not develop.
Although the PLA has certainly been plagued by corruption scandals, the most recent round of purges likely serve a dual purpose, both anti corruption as well as enforcing political discipline in the face of numerous challenges confronting the CCP’s hold on power. The Chinese economy has been facing significant headwinds with annual GDP growth below expectations and the recent round of American tariffs have exacerbated those headwinds and we see greater social unrest as a result. Xi has recently suffered a number of major policy failures, including the near collapse of the Chinese housing market, the disaster of his Zero-Covid response to the pandemic, and his chaotic attempt to reign in large tech firms with aggressive law enforcement during his “Common Prosperity” campaign. These policies have not only failed in reaching their objectives but harmed the credibility of the Chinese government to deliver competent solutions, and placed Xi in a more vulnerable position.
Xi likely targeted the military, not just officials in the departments directly responsible for these initiatives, because it is an essential tool to remaining in power if he were ever directly challenged. Furthermore, removing particular officials who were directly responsible for these policies would be an admission of failure by Xi, and further undermine his credibility. Indeed, some of the top proponents of his Zero Covid policy, such as the mayor of Shanghai, Li Qiang, who famously shut down a city of over 30 million people, were elevated to the highest levels of political leadership as a reward. Instead removing top military officials creates an air of fear within the broader party ranks to dissuade dissent without implying to backtrack on a particular policy.
Given the nature of Xi’s military purge and the growing challenges facing China from slowing economic growth, geopolitical rebalancing, demographic decline, and the limitations of the Chinese political model, one should expect the purges like this to continue long into the future. Unless Xi’s grand schemes, such as his moonshot-style industrial policy agendas, succeed, one can expect the CCP general secretary to consistently resort to mass sackings to maintain his hold on power and order within the CCP. If this trend is not mitigated, one could expect the entire Chinese political and bureaucratic apparatus to be turned into anxious yes-men, drastically limiting Xi’s access to impartial opinions and competent subordinates.